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Abstract
Social networks rely on basic rules of conduct to yield functioning societies in both human and animal populations. As
individuals follow established rules, their behavioral decisions shape the social network and give it structure. Using dynamic,
self-organizing social network models we demonstrate that defying conventions in a social system can affect multiple levels
of social and organizational success independently. Such actions primarily affect actors’ own positions within the network,
but individuals can also affect the overall structure of a network even without immediately affecting themselves or others.
These results indicate that defying the established social norms can help individuals to change the properties of a social
system via seemingly neutral behaviors, highlighting the power of rule-breaking behavior to transform convention-based
societies, even before direct impacts on individuals can be measured.
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Introduction
Social interactions determine positions of individuals within
their group (and the associated fitness consequences), and also
define a quantifiable social structure indicative of the overall
group organization [1–7]. While relative success of behavioral
strategies in a population will depend on their selective
(dis)advantages [8–10], breaking the rules of conduct will
inevitably affect others [11–14]. Defying social norms has the
potential to change the functioning of an entire system [15–17],
affecting the social success and/or fitness of all group members.
For example, an individual’s actions could facilitate population-
wide change by making other strategies less viable through
mechanisms such as selection or cultural transmission [8,18], as
well as co-evolution in social dilemmas and similar evolutionary
games based on cooperation [7,9,19,20], reviewed in [10].
Similarly, the interaction structure of a group may be altered
by behavioral actions of individuals, disrupting processes such as
flow of information [21] or connectedness of different network
components [22,23]. Group organization may be important if it
helps the emergence of key individuals which will then have a
beneficial effect on survival of the entire group [22,24]. Removal
or disruption of the emergence of such individuals may therefore
harm all involved, even though immediate social positions of
other individuals are not directly altered [16,25,26]. A system’s
social structure could also be more or less robust to the effects of
behavioral decisions that break the rules of established norms
[27]. If living within a social network with clearly defined
structure and rules of conduct has benefits, for example by
reducing the need for repeated tests of competence from
interacting individuals [28], rule-breaking behavior has the
potential to transform the system beyond its immediate impacts,
altering not only the expected social success at the individual
level, but also the structure and global properties of a system. The
consequences of such rule violations should therefore be
investigated not only through ramifications for the individuals
that perform them, but also through the broader social impacts of
rule-breaking behavior on network properties.
Elegant studies have already investigated how individual
cooperative behaviors, motivated by self-interest and returns from
cooperative strategies, can be selectively maintained from the
perspective of evolutionary game theory [7,9,10,19,20]. Further
work has explored the emergence of institutional organizations
from these strategies [29–31], frequently relying on reinforcement
from either reward [32–34] or punishment [17,35–38]. To
complement and contrast these game-theoretic methods, in which
rational individuals choose social partners or strategies on the basis
of known fitness payoffs from games, we instead focused on a
system in which individuals can evaluate only relative network
positions of partners as indirect proxy measures for potential
payoffs, but are unable to accurately predict the fitness impacts of
their choices. To study the emergence of organization and
potential for individual and organizational success in such groups,
we therefore simulated a network of individuals that chose their
social partners exclusively by using partner’s perceived social
prominence. Such a framework is particularly well suited for this
purpose [39], as social networks permit quantification of both
individuals’ personal positions within a group [6,40] and the global
properties of an entire group [41,42]. Our networks featured
dynamic, individual-based behavioral rules, in which each
individual’s social prominence fluctuated as a result of social
decisions of others, while system-wide properties emerged from
this self-organization. In these simulations, all social choices were
free: individuals were only concerned with retaining desirable
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others nor did they coordinate actions to achieve a common good.
Systems of this kind yield stable emergent properties of social
structure despite their inherently stochastic nature [39], allowing
independent characterization of the impacts of divergent behav-
ioral decisions at multiple levels.
Individuals in our networks chose ‘friends’ using two different
measures of social centrality (Fig. 1; see also [6,40,43]), either
according to the partner’s quality as a necessary intermediary
between others (also called betweenness) or according to the
partner’s popularity (also called in-degree), to determine which
affiliations to maintain. While these measures may be considered
proxies for any evaluative metric by which a self-organizing social
system yields differences in centrality among individuals [6],
populations that employ such centrality measures or their proxies,
and their potential implications for individual fitness, have been
documented in real-world networks [13,14,22]. Individuals that
did not follow these rules of conduct instead changed their social
partners at random, thus breaking the social conventions used by
the rest of the group. Initially, all affiliations were assigned
randomly and all individuals had the same probability of being
chosen as partners. This random initial structure then dictated
each individual’s desirability as a partner according to the assigned
affiliation criteria: for individuals that followed conventions, the
more prominent the individual’s social position, the more likely
others were to remain affiliated with it. The criteria for affiliation
were treated as simple social conventions [44,45]: while they may
or may not have specific fitness analogues in particular systems, in
our simulations they served only to drive the self-organizing
behaviors in non-deterministic social systems.
To determine how breaking the rules of conduct affects a social
network, we compared networks of individuals who all preferred
partners with high individual centrality (by either the quality-as-
intermediary or popularity metric; Figs. 2A and 3A, respectively)
to those featuring different frequencies of rule-breakers: either with
only a single rule-breaking individual (Figs. 2B and 3B) or with a
substantial proportion (20%) of rule-breaking individuals (Figs. 2C
and 3C). We then calculated the individual centrality that each
individual could expect to attain, and the group-wide level of
centrality as an emergent property of the group. By calculating the
impact of rule-breaking behavior at different levels of organiza-
tional success, we determined that it is possible to affect the
organizational structure of a group without directly affecting the
social positions of individuals. Such system-level consequences
offer quantitative insights into the transformative powers of rule-
breaking behavior in groups that adhere to social norms and
conventions and/or rely on the network structure to function
effectively.
Results and Discussion
Behavioral decisions by which individuals chose their social
partners significantly affected both their own position and the
social organization of the group. Moreover, the two scenarios
produced markedly different results: individuals primarily affected
their own social position in the intermediary-based networks, while
in the popularity-based networks they affected the overall social
structure without producing any immediate effects at the
individual level.
When intermediary quality was the social convention guiding
partner choice, individuals that broke the social rules of conduct
affected their own success (Fig. 4A), the social success of
convention-abiding majority (Fig. 4B), and the group organization
as a whole (Fig. 4C). Even a single individual that affiliated
randomly directly affected its own social position. Such direct
consequences would then either cause such rule-breaking behavior
to spread in, or disappear from, the population. However, since a
single individual had no effect on others and did not affect the
group-wide organization, breaking social rules would make it
either more or less successful than the rest. This effect alone would
then determine whether rule-breaking would become more
prevalent. If rule-breaking becomes more common due to a
positive effect on that individual, the initial advantage would
persist while the success of convention-abiding individuals, as well
as group-wide organization, would change. Thus, in the
intermediary examples, breaking conventions primarily affected
Figure 1. A 3-node network examples demonstrating how
individual centrality metrics were measured. A) Betweenness
centrality: individual in the middle is the necessary intermediary
between the left and right individual, as it lies on the shortest path
between those individuals; the middle individual therefore has higher
individual betweenness centrality than the other two individuals; B) In-
degree centrality: both left and right individual have connections
towards the middle individual, making the middle individual ‘popular’
as a partner; middle individual therefore has higher individual in-degree
centrality than the other two individuals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026652.g001
Figure 2. Examples of intermediary-based networks. A) Uniform intermediary-based network; B) Intermediary-based network with a single
rule-breaking individual; C) Intermediary-based network with 20% of individuals that did not follow this convention. While the simulations were not
spatially explicit, the size of the individuals in a network is proportional to its quality as an intermediary (betweenness centrality). Individuals that
broke the rules of conduct (identified by their blue color) enjoyed progressively higher social success as they increased in frequency, whereas the
success of the convention-abiding individuals decreased at the same time.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026652.g002
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system at higher frequency. Sufficient punishment (such as fitness
loss from not connecting to successful intermediaries) would
therefore prevent a single individual from changing the success of
a group, whereas a reward to the rule-breaking individual could
eventually bring down the entire system. This is consistent with
observed mechanisms in animal and human societies that prevent
rule-breaking, maintaining the functional structure of a group
[46,47].
Interestingly, in popularity-based networks rule-breaking indi-
viduals did not affect their own success (Fig. 5A) or the social
success of others (Fig. 5B), but they did affect the overall group
organization (Fig. 5C). As a single individual was not able to
produce this effect, breaking the social rules of conduct would
initially appear to be completely neutral to the social network and
its constituents. Rule-breaking individuals would have the same
success as if they abided by conventions, and the convention-
abiding majority would not be affected. However, if rule-breaking
behavior was then to increase in frequency (for example, due to
chance in the absence of strong pressure either for or against it),
the success of either rule-breaking or convention-abiding individ-
uals themselves would still not change, but the structure of the
group as a whole would. In these popularity-based networks, rule-
breaking individuals were able to change the structure of a social
network and the nature of how an entire social system works,
achieving this without necessarily affecting any individual in
particular. Despite their potentially global impact, it was only
possible to gauge the true influence of these individuals on the
network by taking into account the system-wide properties. If a
specific network structure is essential for the community (for
example, in hierarchies or other highly centralized network or
organization where most individuals connect only to the few most
popular individuals) a growing number of rule-breakers or
dissenters could affect the success of the entire social group
[16,29].
These multifaceted effects on organized social systems demon-
strate that even simple changes in social behavior can affect
systemic social network properties, which in turn challenges the
way we think about animal and human social networks. Though
the level at which we observe the costs and benefits must be an
individual, the full extent of the impact from individuals’ actions
cannot be gauged without exploring their effects on a community
or a population as a whole. Many social systems, both animal and
human, are based on social rules of conduct which are not always
(evolutionarily or socially) optimal (such as certain sexual taboos
[46], or respect for resource ownership [48]), but which are also
not always arbitrary [48,49], and frequently help make the system
more efficient [26,29,37,47,50,51]. Whereas violation of social
rules often carries direct consequences for the actor, such as
through direct punishment or withdrawal of future cooperation
[17,35,37,38,52,53], even behavioral decisions that seem imme-
diately neutral for the involved individuals (and likely would not
Figure 3. Examples of popularity-based networks. A) Uniform popularity network; B) Popularity network with a single rule-breaking individual;
C) Popularity network with 20% of individuals that did not follow this convention. While the simulations were not spatially explicit, the size of the
individuals in a network is proportional to that individual’s popularity (in-degree centrality). Even though the individuals that used rule-breaking
behavior (identified by their blue color) had social success comparable to the convention-abiding individuals, the emergent properties of the system
changed: with more individuals not playing by the rules, the group became more decentralized.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026652.g003
Figure 4. Effects of rule-breakers on intermediary-based networks. Individuals using rule-breaking strategy primarily affected (A) their own
social position (H(2)=213.18, p,0.0001), but also made an impact on the other aspects of the social system, affecting (B) the social position of others
(H(2)=6.79, p=0.034) and (C) group organization (H(2)=125.3, p,0.0001) as their frequency in a population increased. The boxes show medians,
quartiles, minima and maxima. Results significantly different from a relevant uniform network with no rule-breaking behavior (p,0.05 in Dunn’s
multiple comparison test for comparing each group with control) are designated with *.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026652.g004
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works. The studies of such actions should therefore consider
system-wide properties of both animal and human social networks
without sacrificing any attention to the individual-level conse-
quences of social actions. By changing the properties of the
network on a global level, a single individual has the potential to
change its entire social environment by the power of its own
actions alone. We should therefore aim to determine such systemic
consequences of social behaviors and rule-breaking decisions
before any such actions can be described, and dismissed, as truly
neutral.
Materials and Methods
Modeling environment and dynamics
The modeling environment was designed as a graph G, in which
n individuals were represented as nodes, or vertices, V={v1, v2,… ,
vn} in a network and their interactions as connections between
those nodes. Interactions were directed, in that the distinction was
made between sources and recipients of social interactions so that
an individual vi’s choice to be affiliated to another individual vj was
represented by an arc (vi,v j)i nG, thus resulting in a directed graph,
or digraph. If an arc (vi,v j) exists, individual vj was said to be an
out-neighbor of individual vi. These connections were then used to
determine centrality metrics of individual nodes (individual
centrality), measures of position and connectivity in an interaction
network, as well as centrality of the digraph as a whole (group-wide
centrality). This digraph structure was then used as a basis for
development of a dynamic, self-organizing, individual-based social
network framework in which individuals could display different
social affiliation preferences. All affiliations between individuals
were freely formed, and individuals could only directly affect the
interactions they themselves initiated (that is, choose their own
out-neighbors), but not the actions of other individuals (they could
not directly affect the choices of others to select them as out-
neighbors or not). Each network consisted of a constant number of
50 individuals in total, with each individual assigning outgoing
connections to five out-neighbors. Individuals had no inherent
personal advantages that would prime them to be selected as social
partners, and all subsequent choices were made using dynamic
centrality properties to assess out-neighbors. When the network
was initialized the connections between all individuals were
assigned randomly, giving a graph G0, but were then updated
according to the built-in preference of the individuals for partners
of certain centrality.
The ability of individuals to choose their ‘friends’ by dropping
the connections to existing out-neighbors and forming connections
to new out-neighbors resulted in a self-organizing dynamic
network in which the organization of connections was constantly
updated in accordance to the preset affiliation rules. The dynamics
of the models took place in discrete time steps. At each time step t
in graph Gt, each individual ranked the centrality values of its five
out-neighbors according to its predetermined affiliation prefer-
ence. It then opted to remain affiliated with out-neighbors it
perceived as desirable social partners by retaining the 3 highest
ranking ones while dropping the 2 lowest ranking ones. It then
added 2 new out-neighbors at random from the entire group
(excluding the two it just dropped) before next time step, which
completed the iteration and (when completed by all individuals)
resulted in graph Gt+1. Alternatively, individuals could also drop
out-neighbors completely at random, thus foregoing the conven-
tional assessment of out-neighbor quality through centrality
comparisons in their affiliation choices. Such individuals were
denoted as exhibiting divergent strategy, abandoning the conven-
tional choice of social partners and using an alternative, rule-
breaking strategy in an otherwise convention-abiding, ordered
group of individuals. In all scenarios, the total edge density of the
network was constant since, in each Gt, each individual always had
exactly five out-neighbors; the only parameter that varied between
iterations was the arrangement of connections.
Our goal was to demonstrate the impact of rule-breaking on an
organized group of individuals, rather than achieve any optimi-
zation of social organization in a group. As such, the individuals
did not coordinate their actions to achieve a common goal, did not
consider the effects of their actions on others, and in general did
not behave optimally in an evolutionary sense as there are likely to
be many behaviors, and/or centrality measures by which to
evaluate them, that could do a better job at maximizing
individual’s social prominence [39], such as coercion or cheating.
We also did not aim to ascribe any qualitative importance to
centrality in a social network as a measure of prominence in a
biological group; specific selection pressures can cause either high
or low betweenness or in-degree centrality to be considered
positive [13,14,22] or even to have no directly measurable fitness
Figure 5. Effects of rule-breakers on popularity-based networks. Individuals using rule-breaking strategy did not significantly affect either (A)
their own social position (H(2)=2.99, p=0.22) or (B) the social position of others (H(2)=0.24, p=0.89). However, as their presence in the population
increased, the behavior of these individuals will start to make an impact, affecting (C) the overall group organization (H(2)=284.55, p,0.0001) even
though there is no concurrent measurable effect on the individual values. The boxes show medians, quartiles, minima and maxima. Results
significantly different from a relevant uniform network with no rule-breaking behavior (p,0.05 in Dunn’s multiple comparison test for comparing
each group with control) are designated with *.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026652.g005
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illustrate the fact that even the simplest affiliation differences can
result in distinct and quantifiable changes in group organization
properties even with constant density of social contacts, and that
such properties can be disrupted by breaking the rules of social
conduct.
Centrality measures for individuals and groups
As neither the rules of affiliation nor initial characteristics of
individuals inherently implied any position for individuals or social
structure of a group, centrality measures for individuals and
groups were emergent properties of the social structuring
processes. Two centrality measures were used as proxies of social
quality of partners [6,39,40,54]: betweenness and in-degree.
Betweenness B of individual vi is defined as
Bv i ðÞ ~
2count vi ðÞ
n{1 ðÞ n{2 ðÞ
where count(vi) is the number of shortest paths between any two
individuals in a network that contain node vi as an intermediate
node, and n is the total number of individuals in a network.
Betweenness measures how essential an individual is as a necessary
intermediary between pairs of individuals. In-degree D of
individual vi is defined as
Dv i ðÞ ~
din vi ðÞ
n{1
where din(vi) is the number of individuals that form connection to vi,
and n is the total number of individuals in a network. It is
essentially equal to the number of incoming connections to vi,
measuring how ‘popular’ vi is as a partner. In addition to
measuring centrality of individuals, centrality of groups as an
emergent property was also quantified. Group-wide betweenness B
of group G is measured as
BG ðÞ ~
X n
i~1
B vi ðÞ
n{1 ðÞ n{2 ðÞ
where B(vi) denotes the betweenness of individual i, and n is the
total number of individuals in a network. Group-wide in-degree D
of group G was measured as
DG ðÞ ~
X n
i~1
P   {din vi ðÞ ½ 
n{1 ðÞ n{2 ðÞ
where din(vi) is the number of individuals that form connection to
vi, P*=max [din(vi)|i=1,…,n], and n is the total number of
individuals in a network. Both of these group-wide metrics
quantify how well the group is organized as a whole according
to the respective centrality measure of individuals.
Simulations and analyses
There were a total of 6 network types: 3 betweenness-based (a
uniform betweenness network consisting of only betweenness
individuals, a betweenness network with a single rule-breaker
affiliating randomly, and a betweenness network with 10 randomly
affiliating rule-breakers), and 3 in-degree based types (a uniform
in-degree network consisting of only in-degree individuals, an in-
degree network with a single rule-breaker affiliating randomly, and
an in-degree network with 10 randomly affiliating rule-breakers).
We ran 100 independent Monte Carlo realizations per network
type, and recorded the respective centrality measures of each
individual and group centrality after 200 time steps. Both numbers
were deemed statistically sufficient due to convergence of outcome
variance and comparable stability calculations, as described in
[54]. We used networks in which all individuals had an identical
preference, preferring to remain affiliated with partners of either
high betweenness or high in-degree, as a basal state against which
subsequent scenarios were compared. A random subset of the
sampled measures was used in all comparisons so as to account for
differences in sample sizes, giving the sample size of 100 for each
group in each comparison. We used nonparametric tests (two-way
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA and corresponding nonparametric
Dunn’s post-hoc comparisons of each group with control) in
statistical analyses due to the heteroscedasticity and non-normal
distributions of the results. The networks were visualized using
Gephi 0.8 (Bastian M, Heymann S, Jacomy M, unpublished).
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